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This paper addresses two basic issues related to technological innovation and climate 
stabilisation objectives: i) Can innovation policies be effective in stabilising greenhouse gas 
concentrations? ii) To what extent can innovation policies complement carbon pricing (taxes 
or permit trading) and improve the economic efficiency of a mitigation policy package? To 
answer these questions, we use an integrated assessment model with multiple externalities and 
an endogenous representation of technical progress in the energy sector. We evaluate a range 
of innovation policies, both as a stand-alone instrument and in combination with other 
mitigation policies. Even under fairly optimistic assumptions about the funding available for, 
and the returns to R&D, our analysis indicates that innovation policies alone are unlikely to 
stabilise global concentration and temperature. The efficiency gains of combining innovation 
and carbon pricing policies are found to reach about 10% for a stabilisation target of 535 ppm 
CO2eq. However, such gains are reduced when more plausible (sub-optimal) global 
innovation policy arrangements are considered. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The issue of the role and potential effectiveness of technological change for mitigating 
climate change has gained momentum in both the literature and the political debate over the past 
decade. Despite the many uncertainties around the magnitude of the impacts of technological 
change on mitigation costs, there is now broad agreement that innovation will be required to foster 
the needed decarbonisation of the economy. Furthermore, in the presence of both environmental 
and innovation externalities, the optimal set of climate policy instruments should include explicit 
R&D and possibly technology diffusion policies, in addition to carbon pricing policies that 
stimulate new technology purely as a side effect of internalising the environmental externality (Jaffe 
et al. (2005) and Bennear and Stavins (2007)). On the other hand, relying on R&D alone might be 
not sufficient to achieve stringent targets and/or to minimise mitigation costs, because such an 
approach would provide no direct incentives for the adoption of new technologies and, by focusing 
on the long term, would miss near-term opportunities for cost-effective emissions reductions 
(Philibert, 2003; Sandén and Azar, 2005; Fischer 2008).  
 
Against this background, innovation and technology policies have received considerable 
attention from policymakers in the past few years. Proposals of international technology agreements 
have been put forward, that would encompass domestic and international policies to foster R&D 
and knowledge-sharing (Newell 2008). Innovation strategies have also been analysed in the context 
of climate coalition formation, suggesting that they are indispensable for improving the robustness 
of international agreements to control climate change (Barrett 2003). On the policy side, some 
climate-related scientific and technology agreements have emerged, including the Carbon 
Sequestration Leadership Forum, the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, 
and the International Partnership for a Hydrogen Economy. Most recently, the accord signed in 
Copenhagen at COP15 envisages a network of “Climate Innovation Centres” to facilitate 
collaboration on clean technologies between developed and developing nations. 
 
Despite the growing interest for climate-related technological change, there is so far limited 
quantitative evidence on the role that innovation policies should play in a climate stabilisation 
policy package, as well as on the particular R&D areas that should be targeted. Popp (2006) has 
shown that combining carbon pricing and R&D policies can yield welfare gains, but that these are 
modest with respect to the optimal carbon tax case. Fischer and Newell (2008) find that an optimal 
portfolio of policies that includes, among others, emissions pricing and R&D can achieve 
significant efficiency gains.   3
 
Energy-economy-climate models used to evaluate mitigation policies have incorporated 
innovation mechanisms such as R&D investments only to a limited extent. This is a drawback, 
since the optimal policy mix is likely to depend on the returns to scale of energy technologies that 
are subject to learning (Gerlagh and van der Zwaan (2006)), and that are determined by the 
evolution of the whole energy system. Also, the limited analysis available of R&D investments 
required to comply with climate stabilisation objectives (Shock et al 1999, Davis and Owens 2003, 
Nemet and Kammen 2007) has been carried out mostly outside the realm of general equilibrium 
models. The main objective of this paper is to bring innovative input to the debate on the role of 
technology policy for climate change mitigation, focusing on the interplay between innovation and 
carbon pricing policies using the rich set-up allowed by integrated assessment models. To this end, 
we investigate several potential intervention strategies, with technology policies being used either 
as a substitute or as a complement to carbon pricing.  
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the 
model used in this paper, WITCH, focusing on the various channels of endogenous technological 
change featured in the model and the types of innovation policies that can be assessed. Section 3 
looks at the climate effectiveness of innovation policies, i.e. at the extent to which such policies 
alone can bring about emission reductions. Section 4 then turns to the economic effectiveness of 
innovation policies, i.e. the extent to which they can lower the economic costs of a climate policy 
package aimed at meeting a given climate change mitigation target. We assess the potential 
economic efficiency gains from hybrid innovation/carbon pricing policies relative to a pure carbon-
pricing approach, and compare these potential efficiency gains to those achievable in practice when 
considering politically more realistic – but sub-optimal – policy combinations. Section 5 concludes 
the paper by summarising its main results. 
 
2. Endogenous technological change and innovation policy options in WITCH 
 
The analysis presented in the paper is carried out using the World Induced Technical 
Change Hybrid (WITCH) model, an energy-economy-climate model developed by the climate 
change group at FEEM. The model has been used extensively for economic analysis of climate 
change policies.
1 The Appendix to this paper provides a short introduction to the model, focusing in 
particular on the modelling of the channels that foster technological change.  
                                                 
1 See www.witchmodel.org for a list of applications and papers.   4
 
WITCH is an economic model with an in-built representation of the energy sector, thus 
belonging to the class of fully integrated (hard link) hybrid models. It is a global model divided into 
12 macro-regions. The model has two main distinguishing features in the context of the present 
analysis. The first one is a representation of endogenous technical change in the energy sector. 
Advancements in a range of carbon mitigation technologies are described by both innovation and 
diffusion processes. Learning-by-Researching (LbR) and Learning-by-Doing (LbD) shape the 
optimal R&D and technology deployment responses to given climate policies. In terms of 
innovation market failures, energy-related knowledge in a country depends not only on the 
country’s own R&D investments but also on those made by others, via an international spillovers 
mechanism. For a given region, the magnitude of such spillovers depends on the distance of its 
R&D knowledge stock (cumulative past R&D) to the frontier, but also on its absorptive capacity 
which depends positively on its knowledge stock. This gives rise to a bell-shaped relationship 
between a country’s R&D knowledge stock and spillovers, with the latter being lowest when the 
former is either very low (weak absorptive capacity) or very high (small distance to technological 
frontier) (for details, see Bosetti et.  al., 2008 and the Appendix of this paper). In turn, these 
international R&D spillovers provide a case for international R&D policies.  
 
WITCH accounts for higher social returns from R&D by calibrating a higher marginal price 
of capital and assumes an exogenous crowding out of other forms of R&D. Thus, the implications 
of biased technical change are not considered here, but they have been evaluated in applications of 
WITCH on the direction and pace of technical progress (Carraro et. al. (2009a)) and on human 
capital formation (Carraro et al. (2009b)). Nevertheless, it should be noted that important additional 
R&D externalities, such as appropriability and knowledge protection issues, are not captured due to 
the aggregated structure of the model. 
  
The second relevant modelling feature is the game-theoretic set up. WITCH is able to 
produce two different solutions. The first is the so-called globally optimal solution, which assumes 
that countries fully cooperate on global externalities. The second is a decentralised solution that is 
strategically optimal for each given region in response to all other regions’ choices, and corresponds 
to a Nash equilibrium. This modelling feature allows accounting for externalities due to all global 
public goods (CO2, international knowledge spillovers, energy markets, etc...), making it possible to 
model free-riding incentives. It also allows exploring the environmental and economic effects of,   5
and the potential interactions between different policies aimed at internalising the technological 
externality and/or the climate externality.  
 
Three types of innovation policies summarised in Table 1 are considered in this paper, which 
differ in the type of R&D they subsidise:  
i)  Energy intensity enhancing R&D investments (E.E.). The model assumes that an energy 
efficiency capital stock can be built through dedicated R&D investments, which is a 
substitute for physical energy (via a constant elasticity of substitution production 
function) in producing final energy demand. 
ii)  Wind, solar and Carbon Capture and Storage R&D investments (W+S & CCS). The 
investment costs of wind, solar and CCS can be decreased by innovation investments, 
via an LbR formulation that relates proportional increases in the knowledge capital to 
productivity improvements.  
iii) Breakthrough technologies R&D investments (Advanced Techs). As with wind, solar and 
CCS, LbR decreases the cost of two non-commercial, advanced carbon-free 
technologies. These technologies can substitute for existing ones in the electricity and 
non-electricity sectors, respectively. 
 
Acronym  Innovation Policy Features 
E.E.  R&D for energy efficiency enhancement 
W+S & CCS   R&D to improve productivity of wind, solar and CCS  
Advanced Techs  R&D for advanced, breakthrough technologies 
Table 1: The three types of innovation policies considered in this paper 
 
 
These three types of innovation policies are assessed in terms of both their potential carbon 
emission abatement potential if used as stand-alone policies, and the economic efficiency gains they 
can generate when combined with an explicit climate stabilisation policy.  
 
3. Climate effectiveness of innovation policies 
 
We start by analysing the environmental effectiveness of standalone innovation policies, 
looking at their impact on carbon emission and concentration trajectories over the century. We 
simulate innovation policies assuming global R&D funds of various sizes are used to subsidize the 
three categories of Table 1. As a central value, we use a fund size equal to 0.08% of Global World   6
Product (GWP). This share is consistent with the optimal R&D investments needed to comply with 
a stringent climate stabilisation policy in the WITCH model (Bosetti et. al. 2009a), and is in line 
with the peak level of public energy R&D expenditures achieved across the OECD area in the early 
1980s. Similar values have also been suggested in other recent analyses (IEA, 2008). For robustness 
check, and in order to assess the maximum world emission reduction that could be achieved through 
a stand-alone innovation policy, we pursued additional experiments with incrementally larger funds 
amounting to up to 2% of GWP. The international R&D fund is assumed to be financed by 
contributions from OECD regions that are proportional to their GDP (0.08% in most of our 
analysis). In turn, each world region receives from the international R&D fund a subsidy which 
adds to its own regional R&D investments in innovation. The fund is distributed across regions on 
an equal per capita basis, although alternative distribution rules were also tested to check for 
robustness.  
 
Figure 1 and 2 report CO2 emissions and concentrations for the 4 innovation policies, as 
well as for the reference (BAU, no policy) and a climate stabilisation pathway at 450 CO2  (535 
CO2-e) ppmv. The main result is that all innovation policies fall short of generating the mitigation 
action needed to stabilise carbon concentrations. In all cases, the atmospheric stock of CO2 keeps 




Figure 1. Fossil fuel emission paths under alternative innovation policies, compared with 
emission paths in the baseline and 450 ppm CO2 only stabilisation cases. 
 
   7
There are differences across innovation policies, however. The “Advanced Techs” R&D 
policy, under which two advanced technologies become competitive via R&D investments, yields 
the higher mitigation and manages to stabilise carbon emissions – albeit not concentrations. Given 
the improvements needed and commercialisation lags, these technologies become effectively 
available around mid-century, leading to some emission reductions afterwards. The “W+S & CCS” 
R&D policy achieves somewhat smaller reductions relative to BAU, and with a different time 
profile. Unlike new breakthrough technologies, wind, solar and CCS can quickly penetrate the 




Figure 2. CO2 concentration paths under alternative innovation policies, compared with 
emission paths in the baseline and 450 ppm CO2 only stabilisation cases. 
 
 
However, in the long term returns to R&D investments in both technologies are limited  by 
the resource constraints in terms of site availability (for Wind and Solar) and storage repository (for 
CCS) . The last option, namely R&D dedicated to energy efficiency (E.E.), is almost ineffective for 
two reasons. First, some decline in energy intensity is already embedded in baseline scenarios, 
consistent with the dynamics of the last 50 years. As a consequence, achieving additional energy 
efficiency improvements via R&D is fairly expensive at the margin. Second, efforts to decarbonise 
the economy will ultimately be crucial to make a dent in emissions. This cannot be achieved 
through improvements in energy efficiency alone, and rather requires the progressive phasing-out of 
fossil-fuel-based energy technologies.    8
 
While the above simulations assume sizeable R&D spending, roughly four times higher than 
current public energy-related expenditures, one open question is whether even higher spending 
might overturn our conclusions. Likewise, mixed strategies combining all three types of R&D could 
in principle deliver higher returns, especially since alternative options differ in the time profile and 
long-run potential of the emission reductions they can achieve. We have therefore carried out a 
number of sensitivity analyses, varying the size and allocation of the technology fund. A very 
robust finding across all simulations is that the largest achievable reduction in emissions with 
respect to the baseline is in the order of 13%-14% in cumulated terms throughout the century, in the 
range of the “Advanced Techs” case discussed above. In particular, while a larger international 
R&D fund induces larger emission reductions over the medium term, its long-term impact is limited 
by declining marginal returns to R&D, as well as by the positive counteracting impact of the fund 
on world GDP and emissions.  
 
 
Figure 3. Fossil fuel emission paths for different sizes of a mixed innovation policy. 
 
This is illustrated in Figure 3 through a comparison between two funds amounting to 2% of GWP 
and 0.2% respectively, both of which are assumed to subsidise equally all three types of R&D. 
Although the larger fund implies lower emissions in the medium term, by the end of the century the 
two innovation policies result in similar and growing emissions, due to the reallocation of 
consumption from earlier to later periods in time. Furthermore, the medium-term impact of a large 
R&D fund is insufficient to put world emissions, even for the first few decades, on a path consistent 
with long-run stabilisation of carbon concentrations at safe levels. 
   9
4. Economic efficiency gains from hybrid innovation/carbon pricing policies 
 
Although the simulation results from the previous section clearly point to the lack of environmental 
effectiveness of R&D as a stand-alone policy, R&D may still contribute to reducing the cost of a 
climate policy package when used as a complement to carbon pricing policies. The main reason is 
illustrated in Figure 4, which shows the economic gains from a fund amounting to 0.08% of GWP 
used as a stand-alone policy. By internalising international technological externalities and forcing 
higher innovation investments in earlier periods, innovation policies deliver some welfare gains 
during the second half of the century, at the expenses of initial losses. While these gains are small 
under the “W+S & CCS” and “EE” innovation policies, they are sizeable in the “Advanced Techs” 
case, which as discussed before also achieves the largest emission reductions. Thus, R&D programs 
meant to facilitate the development of breakthrough technologies that can help decarbonise sectors 
such as transport appear to hold the largest emission-reduction and cost-reduction potential.  
 
 
Figure 4. Economic benefits (% difference of global consumption with BAU) of stand-alone 
innovation policies, for an R&D fund equal to 0.08% of GWP. 
 
It should be noted, however, that such policies still impose an economic cost in the first 
decades of the century, albeit a fairly small one in this case. Funds of larger sizes generate higher 
early penalties; for example, a fund of 2% of GWP as shown in Figure 3 would yield consumption 
losses of 2 to 3% and benefits only after 2060.   
 
This section assesses the economic efficiency gains from hybrid carbon pricing/innovation 
policies in two steps. In a first step, we illustrate the innovation effects and economic impacts of a 
world carbon price alone under a 450 ppm CO2 only (535 CO2 eq) carbon concentration   10
stabilisation target
2. In a second step, we estimate the economic gains from incorporating an R&D 
policy on top of that world carbon price. 
 
4.1. Innovation and economic costs under a climate stabilisation policy alone 
 
We begin by analysing the optimal investments in innovation when a stringent climate 
stabilisation policy is considered. A policy of this kind, although probably not sufficient to maintain 
the global temperature increase below the 2° Celsius threshold, does require an immediate and rapid 
decarbonisation trajectory, for which currently available mitigation options need to be 
supplemented with innovation in low carbon technologies, especially in the transportation sector. 
Thus, significant increases in R&D are found to be the optimal response to a stringent world cap-
and-trade scheme. For example, as shown in Figure 5, public R&D expenditures are found to 
quadruple with respect to baseline and, as a share of GDP, to approach the peak levels of the early 
1980s.
3 Most of the R&D undertaken is dedicated to the two breakthrough technologies, i.e. to 



















Figure 5. Energy R&D investments (as shares of GWP) in the baseline and the 450 ppm CO2 
(535 ppm CO2eq) concentration stabilisation policy alone, compared with historical figures. 
                                                 
2 We assume the existence of an international carbon market that equalizes marginal abatement costs. Emission 
allowances are allocated on an equal per capita basis. 
3 Bringing back public R&D spending to its early 1980s level is not inconsistent with IEA’s most recent estimates of 
R&D spending needs, using a widely different framework (IEA, 2008). It is also worth noting that at the policy level, 
proposals to raise the energy R&D budgets considerably, even before committing to a cap-and-trade system, are 
apparently being made already. US President Obama recently committed to R&D tax exemptions and an additional 
investment of 1.2 USD Billions in basic energy-related research, see http://news.cnet.com/8301-11128_3-10202041-
54.html    11
The response of R&D and technological change to carbon pricing, in particular the 
emergence of the advanced technologies, plays a major role in containing the costs of a climate 
stabilisation policy. This is illustrated in Figure 6, which compares the costs of the climate policy 
under alternative assumptions regarding investment possibilities in advanced technologies.  
 
One extreme scenario assumes that the possibility to invest in such breakthrough 
technologies is foregone altogether, while an intermediate scenario assumes that R&D investment is 
still possible in the non-electricity technology. Allowing R&D investments in the advanced 
technologies greatly reduces mitigation costs at distant horizons, especially beyond mid-century, at 
the cost of higher losses in the first decades, due to the large increase in R&D effort needed to bring 
about the breakthroughs. Overall, the difference in the economic costs of a stabilisation policy with 
and without the advanced technologies is in the order of 45%, using a 5% discount rate. A strong 
carbon price signal would still be needed in the short term (in the order of 100 $/tCO2 in 2030) to 
foster the large investments needed in both the available abatement opportunities and in the 



















































Figure 6. Costs (% GWP difference with BAU) of a 450 ppm CO2 (550 ppm CO2eq) 
concentration stabilisation policy under alternative assumptions regarding investment 
possibilities in advanced technologies. 
 
 
The development of carbon-free technologies is especially important in the non-electricity 
sector, where the marginal costs of abatement are particularly high. Compared with a scenario 
where R&D investments can be made in both advanced technologies, a simulation where only the   12
non-electricity carbon-free technology is available leads to a small increase in mitigation costs. 
These results highlight the importance of developing carbon-free technologies in the non-electricity 
sector, notably in transport, where currently commercially available mitigation options have only 
limited abatement potential. Also, the electric sector already possesses a fairly rich technology 
portfolio needed to achieve a stringent climate target, provided that nuclear, CCS and renewables 
can be deployed on a sufficiently large scale. This lowers the gains at the margin from investing in 
new advanced technologies in that sector. 
 
4.2. Economic efficiency gains from optimal hybrid innovation/carbon pricing policies 
 
Having shown that a carbon pricing approach would already induce sizeable increases in 
overall R&D spending, which in turn would significantly dampen mitigation costs, we now assess 
the economic efficiency gains from incorporating a global R&D policy on top of that world carbon 
price. This is done by comparing two cooperative solutions of the WITCH model, namely one 
featuring cooperation on both climate and R&D policies – i.e. combining a world carbon price and a 
global R&D investment strategy that internalises all international knowledge spillovers – and 
another assuming cooperation on climate policy only – i.e. the climate stabilisation policy 
considered in Section 4.1 above, which implicitly assumes non-cooperative behaviour of each 
region in setting their R&D spending.  
 
Compared with cooperation on climate policy only, we find that an optimal policy with 
cooperation on both innovation and climate would yield somewhat higher energy R&D 
expenditures. As shown in Table 2, on average global R&D investments increase by about 9 
Billions USD a year, or 9%. The largest increases occur in non-OECD countries: since these are far 
from the technological frontier, increased R&D spending enhances their ability to absorb the world 
knowledge pool. OECD countries also raise their innovation effort, although to a less extent, given 
their lower marginal returns to R&D investments. The highest change occurs during the initial 
periods, up to 2020. 
 
In economic terms, cooperation on both innovation and climate reduces the costs of climate 
mitigation. Global consumption losses (in net present value at 3% discount rate) are reduced from 
1.92% to 1.72%, an efficiency gain of 10% or about 6 USD Trillions. These numbers confirm that 
combining carbon pricing and R&D policies can yield welfare gains, but that carbon pricing alone   13
could go a long way in determining the optimal investment portfolio consistent with climate 
stabilisation (Popp, 2006). 
 
 
  OECD NON-OECD  WORLD 
Climate policy   47.7 40.0 87.7 
Optimal policy  49.3 46.3 95.6 
% difference  3% 16% 9% 
Table 2. Investments in energy R&D (Billions USD, average 2010-2050) for the two policies 
with cooperation on only climate and on both climate and innovation. 
 
 
4.3. Economic efficiency gains from realistic hybrid innovation/carbon pricing policies 
 
The 10% potential reduction in climate change mitigation costs from a global R&D policy 
estimated in the previous version is largely theoretical. Indeed, while cooperation on climate change 
“merely” requires setting up a single world carbon price, in principle cooperation on R&D requires 
an omniscient world social planner that sets an optimal level of global R&D and allocates it 
optimally across time, regions and types of R&D. This is extremely unlikely to be achievable in the 
real world, and as such the 10% represents at best an upper bound.
4 
 
It is therefore instructive to assess the economic efficiency gain that could be achieved by a 
more plausible global R&D policy, and to compare it with the maximum theoretical gain. To this 
end, we assume a global fund making a constant share of GWP, financed by OECD countries, 
allocated to each region on a per-capita basis, and spent only on breakthrough technologies, which 
we have shown have the largest cost-saving potential compared to alternatives. The results from 
such simulations in terms of efficiency gains carried out for a range of fund sizes are reported in 
Figure 7.  
 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that the WITCH model’s aggregate structure does not allow us to model issues related to private 





























Figure 7. Economic efficiency gains (% difference in discounted consumption relative to 
cooperation on climate policy only) from a global R&D fund dedicated to breakthrough 
technologies, under a 450 ppm CO2 (535 ppm CO2eq) concentration stabilisation constraint 
and for different fund sizes. 
 
 
 Unlike the optimal global R&D policy analysed in the previous paragraph, the simple R&D 
fund would only have a small impact on mitigation policy costs, reducing the global cost of meeting 
the stabilisation target by at most 3-3.5% relative to cooperation on climate policy only. The 
reduction in policy costs is highest – albeit small – for a fund of about 0.07% of GWP, roughly in 
line with the ones analysed through the paper. However, the gain is smaller than the one shown for 
the optimal case, given the different regional repartition. Higher spending is not found to be 
efficient due to decreasing marginal returns to R&D.  Overall, the disappointingly small cost 
reduction achieved by the simple R&D fund compared with the maximum achievable savings 
highlights the importance of allocating spending optimally across time, regions and different types 
of R&D.   
 
4.4. Economic efficiency gains from optimal hybrid innovation/carbon pricing policies for a 
looser climate objective. 
 
Our results so far have indicated that innovation is a key ingredient to climate stabilisation, 
and that substantial investments in energy-related R&D are needed to bring about the productivity 
changes required by low emission targets. As such, combining climate and innovation policies 
yields additional benefits, but those would be bounded by the high levels of investments already 
occurring in the climate scenarios. Indeed, our estimates have suggested that for a climate objective   15
of 450 CO2 only (535 CO2-eq) the efficiency gains of coupling innovation and climate policies 
would at best equal 10%. However, the policy considered is a quite severe one, and one might 
wonder how results would change if a looser climate objective were considered. 
 
As a final task, we investigate a climate objective of 550 CO2 only (650 CO2 –eq) and again 
compare the case of cooperation on climate only with that of cooperation on both climate and 
innovation. Table 3 (the counterpart of Table 2) shows the R&D investments in the two scenarios. 
Once again, the optimal policy envisages more investments in R&D than in the climate policy only. 
This time the global increase of investments is in the order of 20%, twice as much as for the more 
stringent climate objective, and also higher in levels (+12.6 Billions/yr), despite the fact that overall 
R&D investments are lower given the less ambitious climate target. The largest increase again 
occurs in developing countries, but developed ones also raise their levels of investments. 
 
 
   OECD NON-OECD  WORLD 
Climate policy  35.2  29.4  64.6 
Optimal policy  38.4  38.8  77.2 
% difference  9%  32%  20% 
Table 3. Investments in energy R&D (Billions USD, average 2010-2050) for the two policies 
with cooperation on only climate and on both climate and innovation. 
 
 
In terms of macro-economic costs, the full cooperation and cooperation only on climate have 
consumption losses of 0.3% and 0.39% respectively. Thus, the relative efficiency gain is about 
30%, significantly higher than for the more stringent climate policy. In levels, however, gains are 
smaller (3 Trillions compared to 6 Trillions) given that the looser climate policy has a substantially 




  This paper has used WITCH, a global integrated assessment model featuring a reasonably 
detailed representation of the energy sector and endogenous technological change, to assess the 
potential for innovation policies to address climate change or to lower the cost of doing so. Two 
main results stand out. First, innovation policies alone are unlikely to effectively control climate 
change. Even under large increases in global climate-related R&D spending and fairly optimistic   16
assumptions regarding returns to R&D in new “breakthrough” technologies, emissions can be at 
best stabilised well above current levels and CO2 concentration be reduced by about 50 ppm relative 
to baseline by 2100 (from over 700 ppm to about 650 ppm, or over 750 ppm CO2eq). The 
decarbonisation of energy needed to meet stringent global emission reduction objectives has to be 
achieved at least partly by pricing carbon.  
 
Second, relative to cooperation on emission reduction (through global carbon pricing) alone, 
international cooperation on R&D (through a global R&D policy that would internalise 
international knowledge spillovers and allocate worldwide spending optimally) might bring about 
additional benefits, of about 10% for a stringent climate policy and 30% for a looser one. However, 
such an optimal global R&D policy is hardly achievable in practice, and under more realistic 
assumptions about the allocation of spending across time, countries and types of R&D, the 
magnitude of economic efficiency gains becomes much smaller. This is because a world carbon 
price alone would already trigger large increases in R&D expenditures, which implies that further 
spending under a global R&D policy would run into decreasing marginal returns. 
 
  These findings are qualitatively robust to sensitivity analysis on key model parameters, 
notably returns to R&D, learning rates and international knowledge spillovers in the various 
technological areas (see Bosetti, et al., 2009b). At the same time, some limitations to our analysis 
should be acknowledged, which call for caution in interpreting our quantitative results. While 
assumed away in this paper, increasing returns to R&D cannot be fully ruled out, and the magnitude 
of international R&D spillovers – a key justification for global policy intervention in climate-related 
R&D – remains highly uncertain for lack of empirical evidence. Also, the model assumes away 
some domestic innovation failures that in practice might provide a stronger case for R&D policy 
intervention than found in this paper. Such failures typically affect any type of innovation, but may 
be magnified in the area of climate change mitigation, such as appropriability problems (lack of 
credibility of intellectual property rights on key mitigation technologies that might emerge in the 
future), lack of credibility of carbon pricing policies (due to the impossibility for current 
governments to commit credibly to a future carbon price path), or failures specific to the electricity 
sector (network effects and thereby entry barriers associated with already installed infrastructure, 
cumulative nature of knowledge, …etc). It is however unclear whether the overall impact of 
credibility problems and lack of specific infrastructures would enhance or reduce R&D investments 
(different effects have sometimes opposite signs) and therefore would increase or reduce the   17
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Appendix: description of the energy-economy-climate model WITCH 
 
  Full details on the WITCH model can be found in Bosetti, Carraro et al. (2006). The 
description below focuses on the overall model structure, and on the specification of endogenous 
technical change processes 
Overall model structure 
  WITCH is a dynamic optimal growth general equilibrium model with a detailed (“bottom-
up”) representation of the energy sector, thus belonging to a new class of hybrid (both “top-down” 
and “bottom-up”) models. It is a global model, divided into 12 macro-regions. A reduced form 
climate module (MAGICC) provides the climate feedback on the economic system. The model 
covers CO2 emissions but does not incorporate other GHGs, whose concentration is typically added 
exogenously to CO2 concentration in order to obtain overall GHG concentration – a 450 ppm CO2 
concentration scenario is roughly assumed to correspond to a 550 ppm overall GHG concentration 
scenario in the simulations below. In addition to the full integration of a detailed representation of 
the energy sector into a macro model of the world economy, distinguishing features of the model 
are: 
•  Endogenous technical change. Advancements in carbon mitigation technologies are 
described by both diffusion and innovation processes. Learning-by-Doing and Learning-
by-Researching (R&D) processes are explicitly modelled and enable to identify the 
“optimal”
5 public investment strategies in technologies and R&D in response to given 
climate policies. Some international technology spillovers are also modelled.  
•  Game-theoretic set up. The model can produce two different solutions, a cooperative one 
that is globally optimal (global central planner) and a decentralised, non-cooperative one 
that is strategically optimal for each given region (Nash equilibrium). As a result, 
externalities due to global public goods (CO2, international knowledge spillovers, 
exhaustible resources etc.) and the related free-riding incentives can both be accounted for, 
and the optimal policy response (world CO2 emission reduction policy, world R&D policy) 
explored. A typical output of the model is an “optimal” carbon price path and the 
                                                 
5 Insofar as the solution concept adopted in the model is the Nash equilibrium (see below), “optimality” should not be 
interpreted as a first-best outcome but simply as a second-best outcome resulting from strategic optimisation by each 
individual world region.   20
associated portfolio of investments in energy technologies and R&D under a given 
environmental target.
6 
Endogenous Technical Change (ETC) in the WITCH model 
In WITCH, technical change is endogenous and is driven both by Learning-by-Doing (LbD) and 
Learning-by-Researching (LdR) through public R&D investments.
7 These two drivers of 
technological improvements display their effects through two different channels: LbD is specific to 
the power generation industry, while energy R&D affects overall energy efficiency in the economy 
and the cost of a backstop technology. 
Learning-by-Doing 
The effect of technology diffusion is incorporated based on experience curves that reproduce the 
observed negative empirical relationship between the investment cost of a given technology and 
cumulative installed capacity. Specifically, the cumulative installed world capacity is used as a 
proxy for the accrual of knowledge that affects the investment cost of a given technology: 
() ( ) ∑
− ⋅ = +
n
PR t n K A t SC
2 log , 1   ,         ( 1 )  
where SC is the investment cost of technology j, PR is the so-called progress ratio that defines the 
speed of learning, A is a scale factor and K  is the cumulative installed capacity for region n at time 
t. With every doubling of cumulative capacity the ratio of the new investment cost to its original 
value is constant and equal to 1/PR. With several electricity production technologies, the model is 
flexible enough to change the power production mix and modify investment strategies towards the 
most appropriate technology for each given policy measure, thus creating the conditions to foster 
the LbD effects associated with emission-reducing but initially expensive electricity production 
techniques. Experience is assumed to fully spill over across countries, thus implying an innovation 
market failure associated with the non-appropriability of learning processes.  Investment costs in 
renewable energy decline with cumulated installed capacity at the rate set by the learning curve 
progress ratios, which is equal to 0.87 — i.e. there is a 13% investment cost reduction for each 
doubling of world installed capacity. 
 
                                                 
6A stochastic programming version of the model also exists to analyse optimal decisions under uncertainty and learning. 
However, it was not used within the context of this paper. 
7 Due to data availability constraints, only public R&D is modelled in the current version of WITCH. However, private 
R&D would be expected to respond in a qualitatively similar way to climate change mitigation policies.   21
Energy Intensity R&D 
R&D investments in energy increase energy efficiency and thereby foster endogenous technical 
change. Following Popp (Popp, 2004), technological advances are captured by a stock of 
knowledge combined with energy in a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function, thus 
stimulating energy efficiency improvements: 
() ( ) ( ) []
ρ ρ ρ α α
/ 1
) , ( ) , ( , t n EN n t n HE n t n ES EN H + = ,  (2) 
where  ) , ( t n EN denotes the energy input,  ) , ( t n HE is the stock of knowledge and  ) , ( t n ES is the amount 
of energy services produced by combining energy and knowledge.  
Assuming that obsolescence makes a fraction δ  of past ideas not fruitful for the purpose of current 
innovation activity, the law of motion of the energy R&D stock is as follows: 
() t n Z t n  HE )  t HE(n , ) 1 )( , ( 1 , + − = + δ                             (3)  
The stock of knowledge ) , ( t n HE derives from energy R&D investments, D R I & , in each region, 
through an innovation possibility frontier where also international spillovers play a role: 
() ( ) ( )
d c b
D R t n SPILL t n HE t n I n  a   t n Z , ) , ( ) , ( , & = ,  (4) 
where  () t n SPILL , is obtained by multiplying the world knowledge pool, KP, and the absorption 
capacity, γ, of each region n: 
() ( ) t n KP t n t n SPILL , , ) , ( ⋅ = γ   (5) 
Parameters b, c and d in equation (4) are calibrated parameters (the interested reader is referred to 
Bosetti et al, 2008 for a more detailed description of the modelling structure and calibration 
procedure).  
Following Nordhaus (2003), and reflecting the high social returns from energy R&D, the return on 
energy R&D investment is assumed to be four times higher than that on physical capital. At the 
same time, the opportunity cost of crowding out other forms of R&D is obtained by subtracting four 
dollars of private investment from the physical capital stock for each dollar of R&D crowded out by 
energy R&D,  D R& ψ , so that the net capital stock for final good production becomes:   22
) t n I t) –  (n (I t n  K )  t (n K D R D R C C C C ) , ( 4 , ) 1 )( , ( 1 , & & ψ δ + − = +   (6) 
where Kc and Ic are physical capital stock and investments, respectively, and C δ  is the depreciation 
rate of the physical capital stock. New energy R&D is assumed to crowd out 50% of other R&D, as 
in Popp (2004).   
R&D in Breakthrough Technologies 
In the enhanced version of the model used for this paper, backstop technologies in both the 
electricity and non electricity sectors are developed and diffused in a two-stage process, through 
investments in R&D first and installed capacity in a second stage. A backstop technology can be 
better thought of as a compact representation of a portfolio of advanced technologies. These would 
ease the mitigation burden away from currently commercial options, but they would become 
commercially available only provided sufficient R&D investments are undertaken, and not before a 
few decades. This simplified representation maintains simplicity in the model by limiting the array 
of future energy technologies and thus the dimensionality of techno-economic parameters for which 
reliable estimates and meaningful modelling characterisation exist. 
Concretely, the backstop technologies are modelled using historical and current expenditures and 
installed capacity for technologies which are already researched but are not yet viable (e.g. fuel 
cells, advanced biofuels, advanced nuclear technologies etc.), without specifying the type of 
technology that will enter into the market. In line with the most recent literature, the emergence of 
these backstop technologies is modelled through so-called “two-factor learning curves”, in which 
the cost of a given backstop technology declines both with investment in dedicated R&D and with 
technology diffusion (see e.g. Kouvaritakis, Soria et al. 2000). This formulation is meant to 
overcome the limitations of single factor experience curves, in which the cost of a technology 
declines only through “pure” LbD effects from technology diffusion, without the need for R&D 
investment (Nemet, 2006). Nonetheless, modelling long-term and uncertain phenomena such as 
technological evolution is inherently difficult, which calls for caution in interpreting the exact 
quantitative results and for sensitivity analysis.
8  
Bearing this caveat in mind, the investment cost in a technology is assumed to be driven both by 
LbR (main driving force before adoption) and LbD (main driving force after adoption), with  t tec P , , 
                                                 
8 This is especially true when looking at the projected carbon prices and economic costs at long horizons – typically 
beyond 2030, while the short-run implications of long-run technological developments are comparatively more robust 
across a range of alternative technological scenarios.   23
the unit cost of technology tec at time t, being a function of the dedicated R&D stock  t tec D R , &  and 
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where the R&D stock accumulates with the perpetual inventory method, accounting for standing-
on-shoulders and spillover effects (see equations (3)-(5)) and CC is the cumulative installed 
capacity (or consumption) of the technology. A two-period (10 years) lag is assumed between R&D 
capital accumulation and its effect on the price of the backstop technologies, capturing in a crude 
way existing time lags between research and commercialisation. The two exponents are the LbD 
index (-f) and the Learning-by-Researching index (-e). They define the speed of learning and are 
derived from the learning ratios. The learning ratio lr  is the rate at which the generating cost 
declines each time the cumulative capacity doubles, while lrs is the rate at which the cost declines 
each time the knowledge stock doubles. The relation between f,e, lr and lrs can be expressed as 
follows:  
f lr
− = − 2 1 and 
e lrs
− = − 2 1           ( 8 )  
The initial prices of the backstop technologies are set at roughly 10 times the 2002 price of 
commercial equivalents. The cumulative deployment of the technology is initiated at 1000 TWh, an 
arbitrarily low value (Kypreos, 2007). The backstop technologies are assumed to be renewable in 
the sense that the fuel cost component is negligible. For power generation, it is assumed to operate 
at load factors (defined as the ratio of actual to maximum potential output of a power plant) 
comparable with those of baseload power generation. 
This formulation has received significant attention from the empirical and modelling literature in 
the recent past (see, for instance, Criqui, Klassen et al. 2000; Bahn and Kypreos, 2003; Söderholm 
and Sundqvist, 2003; Barreto and Klaassen, 2004; Barreto and Kypreos, 2004; Klassen, Miketa et 
al. 2005; Kypreos, 2007; Jamasab, 2007; Söderholm and Klassen, 2007). However, estimates of 
parameters controlling the learning processes vary significantly across available studies. Here, 
averages of existing values are used, as reported in Table A1.  
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Technology Author  LbD  LbR 
Criqui et al 2000  16%  7% 
Jamasab 2007  13%  26% 




Klassens et al 2005    12.6% 
PV  Criqui et al 2000  20%  10% 
Solar Thermal  Jamasab 2007  2.2%  5.3% 
Nuclear Power (LWR)  Jamasab 2007  37%  24% 
CCGT (1980-89)  Jamasab 2007  0.7%  18% 
CCGT (1990-98)  Jamasab 2007  2.2%  2.4% 
WITCH   10%  13% 
Table A1: Learning ratios for diffusion (LbD) and innovation (LbR) processes 
For WITCH we take averages of the values in the literature, as reported in the last row of the table. 
The value chosen for the LbD parameter is lower than those typically estimated in single factor 
experience curves, since here technological progress results in part from dedicated R&D 
investment. This more conservative approach reduces the role of “autonomous” learning, which has 
been seen as overly optimistic and leading to excessively low costs of transition towards low carbon 
economies.
9 
Backstop technologies substitute linearly for nuclear power in the electricity sector, and for oil in 
the non-electricity sector. Once backstop technologies become competitive thanks to dedicated 
R&D investment and pilot deployments, their uptake is assumed to be gradual rather than 
immediate and complete. These penetration limits are a reflection of inertia in the system, as 
presumably the large deployment of backstops would require investment in infrastructures and wide 
reorganisation of economic activity. The upper limit on penetration is set equivalent to 5% of the 
                                                 
9 Problems involved in estimating learning effects include: i) selection bias, i.e. technologies that experience smaller 
cost reductions drop out of the market and therefore of the estimation sample; ii) risks of reverse causation, i.e. cost 
reductions may induce greater deployment, so that attempts to force the reverse may lead to disappointing learning rates 
a posteriori; iii) the difficulty to discriminate between “pure” learning effects and the impact of accompanying R&D as 
captured through two-factor learning curves; iv) the fact that past cost declines may not provide a reliable indication of 
future cost reductions, as factors driving both may differ; v) the use of price  – as opposed to cost  – data, so that 
observed price reductions may reflect not only learning effects but also other factors such as strategic firm behaviour 
under imperfect competition.   25
total consumption in the previous period by technologies other than the backstop, plus the 
electricity produced by the backstop in the electricity sector, and 7% in the non electricity sector.  
The WITCH model has been extended to carry out the analysis presented in this paper to include 
additional channels for technological improvements, namely learning through research or 
“Learning-by-Researching” (LbR) in existing low carbon technologies (wind and solar electricity, 
electricity from integrated gasifier combined cycle (IGCC) plants with carbon capture and storage 
(CCS)). For both technologies we assume investment costs decline with cumulated dedicated R&D 
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